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Introduction
1. These explanatory notes relate to the Model Implementation Bill for the Stormont House
Agreement prepared by a drafting committee led by Professor Kieran McEvoy comprised of
representatives from Queen’s University Belfast, Ulster University and the Committee on the
Administration of  Justice. These notes have been prepared in order to assist the reader of  the
Model Bill and to help inform debate on it (referred to as ‘the Act’ in the text of  the Model Bill).
Summary and background
2. The Model Bill would, if  enacted, give legislative effect to particular elements of  the
Stormont House Agreement (SHA), which was published on 23 December 2014 following
negotiations between the British and Irish governments and the political parties in the
Northern Ireland Executive. In addition to the provisions relating to ‘The Past’, the
Stormont House Agreement contains provisions on: finance and welfare; flags, identity,
culture and tradition; parades; institutional reform; outstanding commitments; and review
and monitoring. These provisions are not contained in this Model Bill and will not, as we
understand it, be included in the UK government’s planned legislation which will focus
exclusively on the past-related elements of  the Agreement. 
3. The drafting committee was keen that the government’s draft Bill should not be the only
starting point for public debate. We wished to ensure that civil society in Northern Ireland
had a full opportunity to contribute to the legislative process; to ensure full compliance with
the UK’s international obligations, particularly Article 2 of  the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR); and to follow closely the principles in paragraph 21 of  the SHA: 
. . . an approach to dealing with the past . . . which respects the following
principles: promoting reconciliation; upholding the rule of  law; acknowledging
and addressing the suffering of  victims and survivors; facilitating the pursuit of
justice and information recovery; is human rights compliant; and is balanced,
proportionate, transparent, fair and reasonable.
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We believed that drafting this Model Bill, in addition to the various other policy outputs
produced by the team over the past number of  years would enhance that process.
4. The SHA contains much less detail than the proposals on the past put forward by Dr Richard
Haass and Professor Meghan O’Sullivan (Haass-O’Sullivan proposals) during the earlier
negotiating process which ended in late 2013. There are many issues where the SHA has left
the detail of  implementation for later resolution. Our Model Bill, which we wish to focus
more directly on Article 2 compliance and the ‘paragraph 21 principles’ in the SHA, proposes
alternative solutions to the leaked Westminster draft Bill on some of  these issues.
overview
PArt 1 PreLIMINAry
5. This Part sets out the ‘founding principles’ (which are to be found in paragraph 21 of  the
SHA) and how they are to be applied and provides definitions for some key concepts that
will be used throughout the Model Bill.
PArt 2 HIStorICAL INveStIGAtIoNS uNIt
6. This Part deals with the establishment, functions, powers and all other aspects of  the
Historical Investigations Unit (HIU).
PArt 3 INDePeNDeNt CoMMISSIoN oN INforMAtIoN retrIevAL
7. This Part deals with the establishment, functions and powers of  the Independent
Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR) and implements the proposed text of  the
international Agreement between the UK and Ireland.
PArt 4 IMPLeMeNtAtIoN AND reCoNCILIAtIoN GrouP
8. This Part deals with the establishment, functions and powers of  the Implementation and
Reconciliation Group (IRG). It makes provision for the report on themes and determines
the IRG’s relations with other legacy bodies.
PArt 5 orAL HIStory ArCHIve
9. This Part establishes the Oral History Archive (OHA) and makes provision for the
collection of  new oral history material and collaboration with existing oral history projects.
It also makes provision for the confidentiality of  contributions in certain cases.
PArt 6 GeNerAL
10. This Part deals with interpretation of  various terms and the procedure for regulations.
SCHeDuLe 1 StAff AND ProCeeDINGS of tHe DIreCtor of tHe HIu
11. This detailed schedule is not included in the Model Bill. The schedule would contain the
details of  information such as arrangements for staff  pensions and conditions, applicability
of  a Code of  Ethics and other matters. Section 5 makes reference to this schedule.
SCHeDuLe 2 text of tHe AGreeMeNt BetweeN tHe uNIteD KINGDoM AND IreLAND oN
tHe eStABLISHMeNt of tHe INDePeNDeNt CoMMISSIoN oN INforMAtIoN retrIevAL
12. This is the proposed text for an inter-state treaty between the UK and Ireland which will
be necessary to establish the ICIR as an international body with jurisdiction throughout the
UK and Ireland.
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Commentary on sections
PArt 1 PreLIMINAry
Section 1 founding principles
13. Section 1 deals with the principles which the SHA states (paragraph 21) must be respected
in the approach to dealing with the past. Sub-section (1) requires that the principles be
considered by public authorities exercising functions under the Act and by courts and
tribunals in interpreting it.
14. Sub-section (3) codifies the principles in a form suitable for legislation. Sub-section (3)5
interprets the reference to human rights compliance in the SHA as the need to protect the
rights guaranteed by the ECHR as defined by the Human Rights Act and other
international standards. These latter include a range of  principles and guidelines relating to
investigations and justice for victims, but will also include relevant texts such as the
Convention on the Elimination of  Discrimination Against Women, UN Resolution 1325
on the role of  women in peacebuilding and the Convention on the Rights of  the Child.
The stronger language in 3(5) providing that fundamental rights ‘must’ be protected reflects
the nature of  such rights as international obligations.
Section 2 Definition of ‘troubles-related’
15. Section 2 seeks to define ‘troubles-related’ in the context of  deaths and human rights
breaches. troubles-related deaths is the term used in paragraph 30 of  the SHA. Various
bodies have adopted different start dates for the beginning of  ‘the Troubles’. However, the
Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 (2006 No 2953) defines ‘conflict
related incident’ as an incident appearing to the Commissioner (for Victims and Survivors)
to be a violent incident occurring in or after 1966 in connection with the affairs of
Northern Ireland. Sub-section (1) adopts the same start date and refers to deaths which
occurred in connection with political conflict in Northern Ireland. No end date is specified
in the SHA and is therefore not provided for in the Model Bill. The SHA does provide that
the initial case list of  the HIU will be made up of  outstanding cases from the Police Service
of  Northern Ireland (PSNI) Historical Enquiries Team and legacy branch of  the Police
Ombudsman, both of  which have a timeframe finishing in 1998. Whilst this will constitute
the bulk of  the HIU caseload, it does leave open the opportunity for families to bring new
cases to the HIU, where there is new evidence, for which this cut-off  date does not apply.
This leaves open the possibility of  the various mechanisms provided for by the SHA
examining some cases that may be seen as transitional between the conflict and the
contemporary justice system.
16. The founding principle of  human rights compliance requires that any investigative
obligation imposed by international standards, and particularly by the ECHR, be carried
out by the appropriate mechanism established by this legislation. Sub-section (2) defines
a ‘qualifying human rights breach’ as a breach of  Articles 2 or 3 of  the ECHR in
connection with political conflict in Northern Ireland. Article 2 ECHR imposes
investigative obligations on the state in the case of  deaths and Article 3 imposes
obligations in cases of  harm occasioned through torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment. The effect of  this will be to bring qualifying conflict-related cases of
attempted murder or serious injury relating to the Troubles within the purview of  the
HIU. They will be qualifying cases where they have involved a breach (i.e. a violation) of
human rights by the state (such as a breach of  the investigative obligation of  Article 3
ECHR). The inclusion of  this provision reflects the reality that there otherwise would be
a group of  cases that the state must investigate to meet ECHR requirements, but would
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otherwise have no competent institution to conduct such investigations. The Police
Ombudsman can only investigate the actions of  police officers, and the PSNI lacks the
necessary independence to investigate state involvement cases. Whilst it would be open
to the state to establish an entirely separate body to the HIU which mirrors its powers
and independence, it would appear more practical to extend the HIU’s remit to deal with
such cases.
17. Sub-section (3)(a) and (b) seek to close a gap whereby the deaths of  persons who died as
an indirect result of  a conflict-related incident, for example, after suffering a heart attack
on witnessing an incident or as a result of  injuries sustained in an incident, might otherwise
not be included in the remit of  the relevant mechanism. Sub-section (3) also intentionally
does not contain a geographical limitation on where the death or qualifying human rights
violation must have occurred. The intention is that such matters where related to the
Northern Ireland conflict, and hence the conspiracy or other actions relating to them will
have taken place within UK jurisdiction, can be investigated by the HIU. This would cover
situations whereby deaths occurred in the Republic of  Ireland or Great Britain but also the
smaller number of  cases elsewhere. The disclosure powers of  the HIU will only extend to
UK public authorities, and its policing powers to Northern Ireland, yet it is intended the
HIU can seek the cooperation of  police forces in Great Britain in the same manner as the
PSNI and cooperation with authorities in other jurisdictions through existing
arrangements. There is specific explicit provision for this in the SHA in relation to the Irish
authorities.
Section 3 Definition of ‘perpetrator’
18. Section 3 follows international standards, and in particular Article 25(3) of  the Rome
Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, in positing a definition of
perpetrator which goes beyond the person who physically carried out the killing etc. Sub-
section (1)(b) and (c) include a person who ordered or knowingly facilitated an offence
which resulted in a death in the definition of  perpetrator. Sub-section (2)(a) provides that
an offence includes an attempted offence and that facilitating an offence includes doing
anything designed to encourage the commission of  the offence. For the avoidance of
doubt the definition of  perpetrator includes ‘state actors’, namely those acting in some
capacity on behalf  of  a public authority.
19. Sub-section (3) provides that, for the purposes of  the HIU, an offence includes
professional misconduct. This is to enable HIU to investigate cases transferred from the
Office of  the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland where the alleged behaviour of
police officers may amount only to misconduct rather than criminality. In compliance with
the SHA principle of  fairness and equality this provision covers misconduct by any
institution rather than solely the police.
Section 4 Definition of ‘investigating bodies’
20. Section 4 lists the organisations covered by the term ‘investigating bodies’ in the Model Bill.
PArt 2 HIStorICAL INveStIGAtIoNS uNIt
Section 5 establishment of HIu
21. The drafting committee understands that the official Stormont House Implementation
Group has agreed that the First and Deputy First Ministers should appoint the Director of
the HIU in consultation with the Department of  Justice; sub-sections (2) and (3) would
implement this decision. The SHA does not specify this process and alternative
arrangements ensuring an independent and effective appointment could be entered into.
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Sub-section (4) seeks to ensure that the appointee has credibility with relevant stakeholders,
including victims’ groups, and that a public statement evidencing the qualifications of  the
appointee for the post is made.
22. Sub-section (5) specifies that the Director of  the HIU is to be a corporation sole. This is
the same status as the Police Ombudsman and Director of  Public Prosecutions and means
that the Director in person possesses the characteristics of  a body corporate. This means
that the obligations, powers and decision-making capacity of  the organisation are vested in
the Director as an individual rather than in a group or committee of  people. The drafting
committee believes that this is the legal construction most likely to facilitate the
independence of  the HIU. 
23. Sub-section (6) places a statutory duty on the HIU Director to take reasonable steps to
secure a gender balance in HIU staff  and that HIU staff  have the expertise and aptitude
to take a gender-sensitive approach. The former provision is similar to that provided for in
legislation for bodies such as the Parades and Human Rights Commissions which is aimed
at securing that the composition of  Commissioners bodies is reflective of  community
background in Northern Ireland. We have not replicated a similar provision on the basis of
community background in recognition that, given the requirements of  independence, many
HIU staff  will be persons from outside of  Northern Ireland. The second provision in
relation to gender expertise draws on international standards. Sub-sections (7) and (8) make
provision for the Policing Board to issue a Code of  Ethics setting out standards for HIU
staff, including compliance with ECHR and other human rights standards. This is similar
to the existing code for PSNI officers. Sub-section (8) defers the detail of  this and other
staffing matters to Schedule 1.
Section 6 family support staff
24. Section 6 provides for the appointment of  the HIU family support staff  in accordance with
paragraph 33 of  the SHA. Sub-section 2 makes clear that this is a complementary role to
the rights of  next of  kin to be involved in an investigation. This is aimed to, for example,
preclude a scenario whereby access to and engagement with investigators is actually
curtailed or limited on grounds of  the existence of  family support staff.
Section 7 Independence
25. Independence is a key element of  the investigative obligation established under Article 2
(right to life) of  the ECHR; sub-section (1) formulates the basic principle that there must
be no connection between those investigating and those whose behaviour is being, or may
be investigated, in the light of  Article 2 jurisprudence. The legal meaning of  ‘persons’
includes organisations and institutions as well as individuals.
26. Sub-section (2) clarifies that ‘connection’ includes past as well as present connection and
also reasonably perceived or suspected as well as actual connection.
27. Sub-section (3) specifies that it is not just the investigating officers on the ground who must
have no connection with those potentially being investigated, but also all those who may
be engaged in the provision of  research, archiving or other support functions.
28. Sub-section (4) specifies that persons that have been members of  organisations which were
engaged in the conflict, lawfully or not, and which therefore might come under
investigation, would be debarred from employment by the HIU. The debarring of
members and ex-members of  the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the British Army is similar
to the position adopted by the Police Ombudsman in its legacy cases. It also precludes
persons who have paramilitary convictions. The purpose of  this provision is to avoid doubt
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and legal challenge to decisions made under sub-section (1). Sub-section (5) notes that sub-
section (4) does not affect the generality of  sub-section (1).
29. Sub-section (6) explicitly links the founding principle of  human rights compliance to the
HIU and provides that it must have regard to the broad range of  human rights instruments
(both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law) which relate to the independence and other desirable
characteristics of  investigative mechanisms.
Section 8 finance
30. Section 8 seeks to ensure that the independence of  the HIU is not compromised by the
manipulation, deliberate or due to general austerity, of  the budget by a sponsoring
department. The specifications that the UK Treasury must determine the HIU’s budget
and that it must be paid out of  the Consolidated Fund mean that Parliament would decide
the figures and they could only be changed by a relevant vote in Parliament.
Section 9 five-year target
31. Section 9 provides for a five-year target for the HIU to complete its work as referenced in
the SHA, though beginning when the legislation comes into force rather than at the date
of  the Agreement. If  that timeframe does not prove viable, sub-section (2) gives a power
to the Secretary of  State to amend the completion date by regulation.
32. Sub-section (3) states that the Secretary of  State must make provision for such an increase
if  one of  two conditions is satisfied. Sub-section (3)(a) states as the first condition that the
Secretary of  State is satisfied that international human rights obligations demand a
continuation of  the work of  the HIU. This circumstance is most likely to arise if  there are
outstanding cases to which the Article 2 investigative obligation applies and there is no
suitable alternative mechanism available to carry out the investigations. Sub-section (3)(b)
states as the second, alternative condition, that the First and Deputy First Ministers believe
there is uncompleted work which the HIU should be allowed to finish.
Section 10 Duty to carry out investigations
33. This section sets out the basic investigative duty of  the HIU. Sub-section (1)(a) specifies
the duty to investigate troubles-related deaths. Sub-section (1)(b) specifies the duty to
investigate alleged or suspected troubles-related human rights breaches (limited by
section 2(2) to breaches of  Article 2 or 3 ECHR). As noted in paragraph 16 of  these
explanatory notes, Article 3 ECHR (freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment), as well as Article 2 (right to life), imposes an investigative duty on the state. In
the absence of  an alternative mechanism, and in accordance with the founding principle of
human rights compliance, the HIU must be able to investigate breaches of  Article 3 as well
as of  Article 2. This provision also has the effect of  enabling the HIU to investigate
breaches of  the investigative obligation of  either Article 2 or 3 even in cases where
investigation of  the death or injury itself  is nugatory, for example, because of  the
subsequent death of  the identified perpetrator.
34. Sub-section (2) specifies that human rights breaches may only be investigated where such
a breach is alleged in a complaint to the Police Ombudsman or is suspected by the HIU
itself  on reasonable grounds.
35. Sub-section (3) has the effect of  placing the various elements of  the investigative obligation
under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR developed in the jurisprudence of  the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) on the face of  the legislation. This is important for a number of
reasons. First, while the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR is actually clear, various elements have
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been disputed from time to time and, for the avoidance of  doubt and to reduce vexatious
legal challenges, it is better to express the investigative duty clearly and explicitly in the
founding legislation of  the HIU. Second, there is a risk that the HIU investigative function
might be interpreted narrowly on the basis of  the references in paragraphs 34 and 36 SHA
to ‘criminal investigation’ and in paragraph 34 SHA to ‘evidence relevant to the
identification and eventual prosecution of  the perpetrator’. These references should not
prevent the HIU having broader investigative functions, covering all the processes required
by human rights obligations. State involvement investigations have usually gone beyond the
threshold of  identifying individual criminality or misconduct to findings on institutional
liability, including whether the state acted unlawfully, in particular on ECHR grounds.
Third, previous investigative mechanisms, particularly the Historical Enquiries Team
(HET), displayed weaknesses in investigative methodology and approach and it is therefore
prudent to detail the investigative process in the legislation itself.
36. Sub-section (4) makes clear, in accordance with the SHA founding principles, that state-
involvement cases must be treated with the same rigour as any other cases. This is designed
to ensure that there is no repeat of  the example of  the unlawful HET practice of  giving
more favourable treatment to suspects in state-involvement cases.
37. Sub-section (5) provides that the HIU must produce a policy which provides a definition
of  collusion. The sub-section is formulated to ensure that attempts to restrict the definition
of  ‘collusion’ cannot be binding on the HIU, which must ensure that its own definition
incorporates a number of  specific matters as well as drawing on the existing definitions
developed in the Stevens and Cory collusion inquires. The definition is required as
collusion is a term used in the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR and part of  the investigative
duty codified in sub-section (3)(d).
38. The SHA (paragraph 30) specifies that the HIU will investigate ‘outstanding troubles-
related deaths’. As noted above, in order to be human rights compliant, the HIU will also
have to investigate breaches of  the investigative obligations under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.
That still leaves a gap, however, in relation to other outstanding (not properly investigated)
troubles-related serious injuries. Sub-section (6) requires the HIU to make at least an annual
report to the Policing Board on whether it recommends an extension of  its remit to deal
with serious injury cases. The Secretary of  State is given a permissive power to make
relevant amendments to the Act if  the HIU recommends an extension.
Section 11 Cases falling within HIu’s jurisdiction
39. The SHA provides that the HIU will ‘take forward outstanding cases from the HET
process and the legacy work of  OPONI’ (paragraph 30). It provides separately in
paragraph 34 that the HIU will consider all cases where the HET and PONI have not
completed their work, including HET cases identified as requiring re-examination. Families
can apply for new cases to be considered ‘for criminal investigation’ where there is new
evidence ‘not previously before the HET which is relevant to the identification and
eventual prosecution of  the perpetrator’. Section 11 seeks to bring together these examples
in a legally consistent and effective manner.
40. Sub-section (1) gives jurisdiction to the HIU to investigate cases which have not been
investigated by other investigating bodies or which have not been completed or which have
been completed but there are good reasons to re-investigate, which explicitly include a lack
of  independence in the original investigation. Note that section 4 lists the organisations
covered by the term ‘investigating bodies’ to include the PSNI (including HET), OPONI,
the Royal Military Police, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Independent Commission
for Police Complaints. Sub-section (3) makes it clear that an inquest having been held does
not debar HIU from investigating a case.
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41. Sub-section (1)(b)(ii) to (iv) lays out the conditions for the HIU taking on cases which may
have been formally completed. The decision in each case is that of  the HIU since it is a
principle of  ECtHR jurisprudence that the state must carry out its investigative duties ‘of
its own motion’ rather than in response to action by, for example, the next of  kin. The first
category includes cases where the HIU has reason to believe that a previous investigation
was flawed in a substantive or procedural respect; the latter may include an investigation
carried out by an organisation or group which lacked the requisite Article 2 independence.
Sub-section (4) specifies that the ‘reason to believe’ may include the decision of  a court or
tribunal. The second category includes cases where there is new evidence, but also where
there may be other reasons to investigate ‘additional matters’. The third category gives the
HIU the option to respond positively to well-founded requests from interested persons,
who might, for example, be the next of  kin, legal representatives, non-governmental
organisations or officials of  any public authority.
42. Sub-section (2) makes it clear that the HIU may not investigate a case which does not fall
into any of  the categories detailed in sub-section (1).
Section 12 Priorities
43. Section 12 provides that the prioritisation of  cases should be chronological, except when
the HIU believes there are special circumstances. These may well include where the next of
kin or other people important to the investigation are elderly or unwell, or when it is more
efficient to investigate certain cases together in the light of  links between them.
44. In order to ensure transparency over the HIU’s prioritisation methodology, sub-section (3)
provides that the HIU must issue an annual report, or more regular reports if  it wishes, to
the Policing Board, providing a breakdown of  both the HIU’s caseload and how it has
prioritised cases. Sub-section (4) makes clear that part of  an investigation, such as taking a
statement, can be carried out out of  sequence, if  needed in circumstances whereby, for
example, a potential witness is elderly or in ill health.
Section 13 Policing powers
45. This section gives full policing powers to officers of  the HIU. Sub-section (1) grants such
officers the powers and privileges of  a constable in Northern Ireland and adjacent UK
waters. The sub-section of  the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 referred to in sub-
section (2) simply defines the powers of  constables as those pertaining for the time being
under common law or any statutory provision and defines UK territorial waters.
46. Section 66 of  the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 details offences such as assault on or
obstruction of  constables. Sub-section (3) has the effect of  extending the offences
concerned to an officer of  the HIU.
47. Sub-section (4) makes it clear that the exclusion of  police officers from certain trade union
and employment rights does not apply to officers of  the HIU.
48. Sub-section (5) provides that all relevant powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence
(Northern Ireland) Order 1989 should be granted to officers of  the HIU. It is noted that
paragraph 36 SHA provides: ‘In respect of  its criminal investigations, the HIU will have
full policing powers. In respect of  the cases from PONI, the HIU will have equivalent
powers to that body.’ This might imply a difference in substance between HIU powers
when dealing with former HET and former Police Ombudsman cases. In practice, there is
little material difference between the powers of  police officers and those of  officers of  the
Police Ombudsman, but this provision ensures that officers of  HIU will have all the
relevant powers they need.
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Section 14 report to the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland 
49. Sub-section (1) provides that in all cases which concern the commissioning of  a crime the
HIU must provide a report of  its investigation to the Director of  Public Prosecutions for
Northern Ireland (DPPNI). This is to ensure that it is the Public Prosecution Service (PPS)
not the HIU that takes the decision on whether there is sufficient evidence to mount a
prosecution. When a HIU investigation does not concern the commissioning of  a crime
(but may cover professional misconduct), there is no prospect of  prosecution and hence
no role for the DPPNI.
50. Sub-section (2) provides that the DPPNI must be consulted about evidential issues and
that any advice should be reflected in the prosecution report. This is designed to ensure
that the expert opinion of  the PPS on evidential matters is able to guide the HIU in its
preparation of  case details. Sub-section (3) reinforces this by providing that the HIU must
include all relevant information in the prosecution report.
51. Sub-section (4) provides that the DPPNI must ensure the independence of  the decision-
making in any case by preventing the involvement of  anyone who was involved in any
previous consideration of  the case, or in a case involving all or some of  the same people.
52. Sub-section (5) is designed to make it completely clear that the fact that an alleged
perpetrator was a state actor or informant is not a reason in itself  to decline to prosecute
in a case.
Section 15 report to deceased’s family
53. It is likely that reports to the deceased’s family will be one of  the main outcomes of  the
work of  the HIU; sub-section (1) directs that this should be done in every completed
investigation of  a death. Sub-section (2) gives a broad definition of  the term ‘family.’
54. Sub-section (3) requires the HIU to give as much information as it can ‘without prejudicing
the administration of  justice’. In practice, this is likely to mean avoiding prejudicing any
potential prosecution of  any person.
55. Sub-section (4) specifies certain aspects of  the investigative conclusions that must be
included in a family report, including whether there were any connections with other cases.
These provisions are designed to ensure that victims receive clear conclusions on some of
the vital issues that are likely to concern them.
Section 16 report to other victims’ families
56. People injured, or the families of  those who were killed, in the same incident under
investigation deserve a full report if  they wish to receive one. This section ensures that the
HIU will prepare such a report.
Section 17 Interim reports
57. This section gives HIU the power to issue interim reports pending the production of
family reports or other victims’ reports.
58. Sub-section 2 provides that the HIU will provide at least an annual report to the IRG
recommending subjects for thematic investigation by the IRG and setting out the HIU’s
evidence base for making such recommendations. This is to fulfil the provision in
paragraph 51 of  the SHA that the other legacy mechanisms refer such material to the IRG.
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Section 18 Public statements
59. The SHA provides that in cases transferred from the Police Ombudsman the HIU will have
the same powers as the Ombudsman would have had in such cases, which would therefore
include the Ombudsman’s power to issue public statements. In light of  the SHA principle
of  fairness, we have extended this power to other HIU cases.
Section 19 Non-publication of information putting lives at risk
60. It is important to balance the family’s and other victims’ right to full information with
restrictions on the disclosure of  information that could put someone’s life at risk. Sub-
section (1) provides that this section applies to family, other victims’ and interim reports
and to public statements.
61. Sub-section (2) specifies that information may be omitted from reports if  its inclusion
might put someone’s life at risk. This is a clear test and is similar to the restriction placed
on the disclosure of  information by the Police Ombudsman.
62. Sub-section (3) provides that the necessary risk assessment is carried out by qualified staff
of  the HIU, not any outside body, and that the Director of  the HIU take decisions on the
necessary editing and redactions personally. This would prevent the misuse of  Article 2
ECHR which has, in some instances in the past, been pleaded to redact non-sensitive
material.
Section 20 other investigations
63. This section ensures that the HIU has primacy vis-á-vis other investigative bodies in cases
that come within its jurisdiction as defined in this legislation. Sub-section (1) prevents any
other body from investigating a case that the HIU is investigating and sub-section (2) deals
with cases involving future complaints to the Police Ombudsman about alleged past police
misconduct or criminality.
Section 21 International obligations
64. Paragraphs 39 and 55 of  the SHA recognise the need for cooperation with the Irish
authorities in general and with respect to cross-border incidents. This section gives the
Secretary of  State the power to make regulations to facilitate this. The section is worded
generally, rather than specifically referring to the Irish authorities, since cooperation with
other states might be necessary.
65. Sub-section (1) gives the power to make relevant regulations to the Secretary of  State to
give effect to any international obligations entered into by the UK government or another
state in respect of  cross-border troubles-related deaths or breaches. The implication is that
such arrangements will be made by international agreement or treaty, or by the application
of  any existing agreements on cooperation in, for example, criminal justice or policing.
66. Sub-section (2) defines the concept of  ‘cross-border’ as acts or omissions connected with
a death or breach which occurred or may have occurred outside the UK. Sub-section (3)
singles out the possibility of  making regulations to allow cooperation with or disclosure of
information to specified non-UK organisations (for example, the Garda Síochána). Sub-
section (4) provides that regulations may modify the effect of  the Act in order to facilitate
cooperation.
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Section 22 Disclosure to HIu
67. Paragraph 37 of  the SHA says: ‘The UK Government makes clear that it will make full
disclosure to the HIU.’ This is an unqualified commitment; this section seeks to give
practical effect to that commitment.
68. Sub-section (1) puts an unequivocal obligation on public authorities to comply with a
request for information by the HIU, but also to allow the HIU to itself  access any
information kept by it. It also allows the HIU to set a reasonable timeframe for the request
to be complied with.
69. Sub-section (2) provides that the HIU must have a unit with responsibility for accessing
and processing information from other public authorities. The implication is that this unit
will be security vetted and capable of  handling, keeping secure and editing for onward
disclosure any information, including highly classified material, which it receives or
accesses, in exactly the same way as a comparable PSNI unit or the similar unit within the
Police Ombudsman’s office. This removes the necessity for any external oversight by any
existing security or policing body or the need for prior assessment, editing or redaction.
70. Sub-section (3) overrides the named and any other enactments (for example, the Official
Secrets Act 1989) and prevents them being used as an obstacle to disclosure. Sub-
section (4) fulfils the same function in respect of  legal professional privilege except where
it is claimed for advice given to an individual in a personal capacity. This provision would
prevent any excuse of  ‘competing legal obligations’ being used to frustrate disclosure to the
HIU. Sub-section (6) grants the HIU a power to direct that public authorities do not alter
or destroy documents or specified materials they hold which may be required for HIU
investigations.
Section 23 transfer of legacy files
71. This section deals specifically with the files of  the HET and other material held by the
PSNI and Police Ombudsman relating to legacy cases. Sub-section (1) says that the PSNI
must ‘as soon as reasonably practical’ transfer such material to the HIU. In practice, this
will not necessarily mean the physical movement of  the material, but it must mean the
transfer of  ‘ownership’ of  the files, together with the unfettered right to access them and
any legal obligation that possession and control of  the material may entail.
72. Sub-section (2) makes clear that the HIU will be responsible for the management of  the
transferred files in all respects and that they must inform the PSNI of  the arrangements
that they have made to accomplish this. This makes it clear that all responsibility, including
onward disclosure (for example, to inquests), transfers from the PSNI to the HIU. The
PSNI would have no oversight power in this respect, but the requirement to inform it of
the arrangements made by the HIU would enable the latter to profit from any relevant
advice from the PSNI.
73. Sub-section (3) puts a similar obligation to transfer relevant material on the Police
Ombudsman.
Section 24 failure to cooperate
74. This section makes if  an offence, which might be committed by an individual, an
organisation or both, to fail to comply with a duty to disclose or provide access to
information for the HIU. Sub-section (2) also makes it an offence to conceal, alter or
destroy information that might be relevant to a HIU investigation.
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Section 25 referrals from the DPPNI
75. This section replicates the existing power of  the DPPNI to refer cases to the PSNI for
investigation to also refer cases to the HIU for investigation. Without such a power the
DPPNI would only have the option of  referring cases to the PSNI that in fact do not fit
within its remit, but rather the remit of  the HIU. The prioritisation of  such cases for
investigation will be a matter for the HIU.
Section 26 Disclosure to the ICIr
76. This section obliges the HIU to share on request copies of  information it holds or obtains
with the ICIR. Such requests will largely relate to verifying information provided to the
ICIR. In order to firewall such requests and knowledge of  them away from HIU
investigators, the clause provides only copies are to be provided and that requests will be
undertaken by the dedicated HIU disclosure unit and no other HIU staff  will be made
aware of  them.
Section 27 Duties to cooperate with the Coroner
77. This section establishes two duties on the HIU to cooperate with the Coroner in
connection with inquests into troubles-related deaths (‘legacy inquests’).
78. Sub-sections (1) and (2) place duties on the HIU through the HIU disclosure unit to share
on request information it holds or obtains in relation to legacy inquests.
79. Sub-sections (3) and (4) relate to the HIU providing investigative services to the Coroner
for legacy inquests. The Director is to establish a specialist Coroners team, separate from
standard HIU investigators, for this purpose. The operational separation of  the teams is
both in recognition that Coroners’ investigations are broader and different to
criminal/professional misconduct investigations undertaken as the main work of  the HIU,
and also to help ensure the existence of  such a role does not risk inquests being subsumed
in other HIU work. Such separation is not intended to preclude cooperation between
investigating teams. A specific duty is provided for to ensure such work is done in a manner
compatible with ECHR rights.
Section 28 oversight by the Policing Board
80. Section 28 is designed to make the HIU accountable to the Policing Board in a similar
manner to the PSNI. The provision is similar to the provision made for the National
Crime Agency in relation to its oversight by the Policing Board. In relation to duties on
the HIU Director to provide information to the Board, the national security caveat
placed on the PSNI Chief  Constable is disapplied in relation to the HIU, given the
express removal and absence of  such a caveat in the SHA. Other provisions such as the
HIU not having to comment on live investigations remain. As with the PSNI, this would
not preclude post-investigation accountability to the Board in relation to a particular case.
Section 29 Inspection of the HIu
81. Section 29, sub-section (1), adds the HIU to the list of  bodies carrying out criminal justice
functions which are to be subject to inspection by the Chief  Inspector of  Criminal Justice
for Northern Ireland (CJINI).
82. Sub-section 2 disapplies the national security caveat placed on CJINI in relation to the HIU,
given the express removal and absence of  such a caveat in the SHA.
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83. Sub-sections (3)–(5) add the HIU to the list of  police-type bodies which can be subject to
the inspections by HM Inspectors of  Constabulary (HMIC). It is not intended that HMIC
carry out annual or routine inspections of  the HIU, given the role of  CJINI who
themselves can call on HMIC for assistance. Rather, the provisions in relation to HMIC
empower the Policing Board to call in HMIC on an ad hoc basis to inspect a specific matter
of  HIU practice. HMIC can publish reports but must redact them not to endanger
individuals. A national security caveat in relation to HMIC reports is disapplied, given the
provisions of  the SHA.
Section 30 HIu complaints
84. This section places the exercise of  particular police powers of  the HIU under the
complaints remit of  the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. It is not intended that
the Police Ombudsman be able to investigate complaints about all aspects of  the HIU’s
work, some of  which would be expected to be dealt with by an internal process. It is
recognised that, in particular, there may be conflicts of  interest if  the Police Ombudsman
were to review HIU investigations which had originated with the office. However, it is
intended that the exercise of  certain police powers by the HIU, such as those of  arrest,
search, seizure etc. are subject to Ombudsman oversight. In a manner similar to the existing
provisions for the Police Ombudsman for immigration officers, the clause provides that a
memorandum of  understanding be developed by the Ombudsman and HIU, and approved
by the Policing Board, which will specify the range of  policing powers exercised by the
HIU which will be subject to the Ombudsman’s complaints remit.
Section 31 finance of external bodies supporting HIu functions
85. This section is intended to ensure the above oversight and inspection bodies are not
precluded from their role in relation to the HIU, which is additional to existing functions,
by lack of  resourcing. In order to ensure independence and in recognition that the HIU
functions constitute an international obligation, this section, as with the HIU, provides that
such functions are resourced from the UK Treasury Consolidated Fund.
PArt 3 INDePeNDeNt CoMMISSIoN oN INforMAtIoN retrIevAL
86. Paragraph 41 of  the SHA states: 
A new body, which will respect the sovereign integrity of  each jurisdiction, will
be established by the UK and Irish Governments, called the Independent
Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR), building on the precedent
provided by the Independent Commission on the Location of  Victims’ Remains.
The objective of  the ICIR will be to enable victims and survivors to seek and
privately receive information about the (Troubles-related) deaths of  their next of
kin. 
This Part seeks to implement that intention.
87. Since the establishment of  this body is envisaged as a joint enterprise by the UK and Irish
governments, it will require an Agreement, with the status of  an international treaty,
between the UK and Ireland. The suggested text of  such an Agreement is included at
Schedule 2; the suggested UK legislation required to implement it is included in this Part.
Legislation will also be required in Ireland to implement the agreement.
88. The ICIR, as described in the SHA, will be a novel institution with many complexities
necessarily arising in its work and many sensitive issues will need to be negotiated. Perhaps
in recognition of  this, paragraph 50 of  the SHA includes the additional principles of
independence and rigour which are to apply to the operations of  the ICIR. The drafting
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committee is of  the view that the full nature and method of  operation of  the ICIR will
have to be expressed at four levels: the Agreement between the UK and Ireland, primary
legislation in the UK and Ireland, regulations that may be made by statutory instrument,
and a statutory Code of  Practice or guidance. These explanatory notes will endeavour to
indicate where the drafting committee feels issues should be dealt with by subordinate
forms of  regulation.
Section 32 establishment ICIr
89. Sub-section (1) refers to the ICIR as a body established pursuant to the Agreement (‘the
Founding Agreement’) between the UK and Ireland and describes its objective as laid out
in the SHA. Sub-section (2) notes that the text of  the Agreement is to be found in
Schedule 2.
90. Sub-section (3) puts an obligation on the Secretary of  State and the First and Deputy First
Ministers to implement in practice the provisions of  the Agreement and in particular to
ensure that the ICIR has independence and autonomy, as detailed in the Agreement.
91. Sub-sections (4) and (5) deal with the period of  existence of  the ICIR. In the first place it
shall exist for five years from the coming into force of  the founding legislation but the
Secretary of  State, after consulting the Irish Minister for Justice and Equality, may by
statutory instrument extend or revive the life of  the body.
92. Sub-section (6) relates to the fate of  the ICIR’s archives. This issue was not addressed in
the SHA. The drafting committee considered requiring that the archives be destroyed upon
completion of  the ICIR’s work, as we were mindful that a guarantee to do so could give
reassurance to possible information providers. However, the Model Bill instead makes
arrangements for the archives to be held securely and confidentially for 50 years in a
manner that is to be determined by the Commission. We felt that this was necessary as the
ICIR has the potential to gather a wealth of  information that may be useful for
understanding Northern Ireland’s history in generations to come. The Model Bill further
stipulates that penalties incumbent on ICIR Commissioners and staff  regarding the
disclosure of  confidential information remain in effect throughout this period.
Section 33 Capacity, immunities and finance
93. Sub-sections (1) to (3) deal with the establishment of  the ICIR as a corporate body and
give a power to the Secretary of  State to regulate to grant privileges and immunities relevant
to an international body and to its functions. The referenced Schedules of  the International
Organisations Act 1968 deal with possible exemptions from tax, rates and excise duties and
other legal obligations of  various kinds. Only some of  these privileges and immunities are
likely to be relevant to the ICIR. However, the most relevant privilege is ‘immunity from
suit and legal process’. These sections therefore give the Secretary of  State power to
implement paragraph 47 of  the SHA which says: ‘The ICIR will be given the immunities
and privileges of  an international body and would not be subject to judicial review,
Freedom of  Information, Data Protection and National Archives legislation, in either
jurisdiction.’
94. Sub-section (4) obliges the Secretary of  State to fund the operations of  the ICIR in such a
way as to guarantee the independence of  the body as provided for in the Founding
Agreement. Sub-section (5) provides that the monies are to be paid out of  the
Consolidated Fund; that is from central UK funds decided by parliamentary vote.
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Section 34 ‘victims and survivors’
95. The SHA uses the terms ‘victims and survivors’ and ‘next of  kin’ of  those who suffered
troubles-related deaths to identify those who might seek information from the ICIR. For
the avoidance of  doubt, and to give the ICIR an element of  discretion, this section defines
such people (‘victims’) as the family of  those who suffered troubles-related deaths and
gives a broad definition of  family with the ICIR able to include persons who it ‘thinks had
a relationship of  a family character with the deceased’.
Section 35 the work of the ICIr
96. The overall purpose of  this section is to oblige the Secretary of  State to make regulations
about aspects of  the work of  the ICIR either specified in the sub-sections or contained in
the Founding Agreement which will provide the legal framework within which it can carry
out its work. As noted in paragraph 88 above, the complexity of  the work of  the ICIR will
be such that it would be more appropriate for the details of  this legal framework to be
provided in subordinate, rather than primary legislation.
97. Sub-section (1) specifies that immunities or other protection must be given to people who
communicate or cooperate with the ICIR. These should be similar to those granted to
people who cooperate with the Independent Commission on the Location of  Victims’
Remains.
98. Sub-section (2) specifies that regulations must compel public authorities to provide
information to the ICIR. The body will, of  course, be attempting to access information
also from non-state individuals or bodies, but it is not possible to compel unknown
individuals or groupings to provide information by law. It is likely that the means of
outreach and the protocols for information-gathering from private individuals or entities
will be contained in a Code of  Practice.
99. Sub-sections (3) and (4) provide for the implementation of  provisions of  the SHA and the
proposed Founding Agreement relating to the confidentiality and inadmissibility in legal
proceedings of  information provided to the ICIR.
100. Sub-section (5) specifies that regulations must prohibit knowingly giving false information
to the ICIR, obstructing its work (by, for example, destroying documents) and any
disclosure of  information by members or staff  of  the Commission. Such prohibition
would implicitly create offences, specifically permitted by sub-section (6)(c). It is accepted
by the drafting committee that taking civil or criminal proceedings against someone who
has, for example, provided false information to the ICIR, but in confidence, might be
difficult or impossible. This is an issue that should be given greater consideration when
drafting the secondary legislation and Code of  Practice.
101. Sub-section (7) makes provision for the Code of  Practice discussed above.
PArt 4 IMPLeMeNtAtIoN AND reCoNCILIAtIoN GrouP
overview
102. Paragraph 51 of  the SHA states: 
An Implementation and Reconciliation Group (IRG) will be established to
oversee themes, archives and information recovery. After 5 years a report on
themes will be commissioned by the IRG from independent academic experts.
Any potential evidence base for patterns and themes should be referred to the
IRG from any of  the legacy mechanisms, who may comment on the level of
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cooperation received, for the IRG’s analysis and assessment. This process should
be conducted with sensitivity and rigorous intellectual integrity, devoid of  any
political interference.
103. The SHA also states that:
l promoting reconciliation will underlie all the work of  the IRG (paragraph 52);
l the IRG will encourage and support other initiatives that contribute to
reconciliation, better understanding of  the past and reducing sectarianism
(paragraph 52);
l in the context of  the work of  the IRG, the UK and Irish governments will
consider statements of  acknowledgment and would expect others to do the
same (paragraph 53);
l the IRG will be 11-strong, with further provision on appointments
(paragraph 54).
the case for statutory provision
104. There is a strong case for giving the IRG a statutory base, instead of  leaving its
establishment and work to be determined simply by administrative or political agreement:
l Statutory provision will give the IRG a firmer and better defined basis for its
existence. It will give the IRG more weight;
l It will ensure that the IRG functions properly and fulfils its mandate in
accordance with the SHA. It will make the IRG less vulnerable to political
dispute and will enhance the process of  reconciliation;
l The IRG has oversight of  matters such as archives and information recovery,
which themselves will have a statutory basis. Statutory provision will help
define the relations between all four new legacy bodies (HIU, ICIR, IRG and
OHA);
l Statutory provision would fix the procedures for the report on themes and
compilation of  the evidence base;
l It would guarantee that the IRG would continue to function for the period
after the HIU and ICIR had been wound up and before the report on themes
was completed.
Structure of Part 4
105. This Part of  the Bill is divided into five headings:
l Definitions (section 36);
l Establishment, nature, status, organisation and governance (sections 37–45);
l Objective and functions (sections 46–47);
l Relationship with other bodies (section 48);
l Report on themes and the evidence base (sections 49–50).
Particular questions
106. The drafting committee has sought to address the following particular questions:
l the appointment and tenure of  the members of  the IRG;
l the duration of  the IRG;
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l the nature of  the IRG’s oversight of  themes, archives and information
recovery;
l the extent of  the IRG’s work on outreach, reconciliation and statements of
acknowledgment;
l the handling of  the report on themes, including its timing;
l the compilation of  the evidence base.
Section 36 Definitions relevant to the IrG
107. Section 36 provides a list of  definitions relevant to the IRG. When the relationship between
the various parts of  the Bill is finally determined, some of  these definitions might fit better
in section 69 (interpretation) applying to the Bill as a whole. Particular definitions are
discussed further below in the context of  the provisions to which they relate.
Section 37 establishment of the IrG
108. Sub-section (1) provides for the establishment of  the IRG as a body corporate. The
arguments for a statutory body have been set out in paragraph 104 above.
109. Sub-section (2) provides that the members of  the IRG shall be appointed by the First
Minister and Deputy First Minister, acting jointly, as soon as practicable after the entry into
force of  this section and in accordance with nominations under this section. The SHA does
not give the Secretary of  State a role in the nomination or appointment procedure, either
of  the Chair or other members, so the Bill has excluded the Secretary of  State entirely from
the appointment procedures outlined in sub-sections (2) to (8).
110. Sub-section (3) specifies that the IRG shall consist of  11 members in accordance with
paragraph 54 SHA (first sentence).
111. Sub-section (4) provides that First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall nominate the
Chair in accordance with paragraph 54 (third sentence). As in the SHA, the sub-section
specifies that the Chair shall be independent and of  international standing.
112. Sub-section (5) follows the nomination procedures for other members of  the IRG outlined
in paragraph 54 (fourth sentence).
113. Sub-section (6) bars from appointment publicly elected representatives, following
paragraph 54 (second sentence).
114. Sub-section (7) encourages those making nominations to the IRG to work together to
ensure gender balance. This reflects a principle which the drafting committee has sought
to apply to all the new legacy bodies, for example, by section 5(6) in the case of  the HIU
and paragraph 5(9) of  the Founding Agreement in the case of  the ICIR.
115. Sub-section (8) specifies the qualities and experience required for members of  the IRG and
the requirement to act independently and impartially, free from any political interference.
The criteria are similar to those required for Commissioners of  the ICIR by paragraph 5(8)
of  the proposed Founding Agreement.
Section 38 Chair of the IrG
116. This provides for the appointment of  the Chair and the Chair’s replacement in the event
that he or she resigns or is not able, willing or fit to perform the functions of  office. It is
similar to other provisions for office-holders in the case of  other institutions, for example,
the Commissioners of  the ICIR under paragraph 6 of  the Founding Agreement.
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Section 39 other members of the IrG
117. Sub-section (1) suggests a term of  three years for members of  the IRG. This is not
specified in the SHA. The argument for three years is that this allows the possibility of  both
change and renewal of  members of  the IRG a reasonable period after its establishment
(three years), but before a decision is taken on the report on themes (at five years). The
likely life of  the IRG is about nine years, allowing for completion and publication of  the
report on themes: see section 49(5) and (6). A tenure of  three years would fit with this
cycle, allowing two points of  renewal or review. An alternative might be appointment for
the full life of  the IRG, but this might make membership of  the IRG too static.
118. Sub-section (2) allows for the situation where the IRG’s work is completed while a part of
a three-year period of  tenure of  the members remains outstanding. It provides that the
appointment of  the members lapses with the completion of  the IRG’s work.
119. Sub-sections (3) to (6) are provisions parallel to section 38(2) to (5), dealing with cases
where a member of  the IRG resigns or is not able, willing or fit to perform the functions
of  office.
Section 40 remuneration and allowances
120. Section 40 enables the Chair, in consultation with the First Minister and Deputy First
Minister, to determine the terms of  appointment of  members including, in particular,
whether members shall work for the IRG on a full-time or part-time basis (according to the
requirements of  the IRG from time to time). The requirements of  the IRG may vary, but
it is likely to be sufficient for the members to work part-time.
Section 41 Secretariat
121. The IRG is likely to have a lighter burden of  work than the HIU, ICIR and OHA, but will
still require administrative support for its work on reconciliation, themes and
acknowledgment and for its oversight duties. Section 41 therefore proposes the
establishment of  a Secretariat, with similar provisions to the other institutions.
Section 42 funding
122. This section guarantees continued funding for the IRG, including its staff  and
administration, out of  the Consolidated Fund.
Section 43 Annual report
123. The IRG would account for its work by means of  an annual report of  its activities.
124. Sub-section (2)(a) specifies that the report may include recommendations to groups and
bodies in Northern Ireland, including the legacy institutions, and to the two governments
for further work on implementation and reconciliation within the scope of  its mandate.
This reflects the IRG’s broader remit of  promoting and supporting reconciliation under
paragraph 52 SHA.
125. Sub-section (2)(b) specifies that the report may comment on the level of  cooperation
between the legacy institutions and others. This picks up the reference to such cooperation
in paragraph 51 SHA.
Section 44 Governance
126. The Bill cannot lay down detailed provisions of  governance but, with a body 11 strong and
drawn from various political groupings, it ought to provide some basic principles of
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decision-making. Hence the draft suggests that ordinary decisions should be taken by a
simple majority, but that the decision to commission the report on themes should be
approved by at least seven members.
Section 45 Duration
127. This section, taken together with section 46(b) and section 49(5) and (6), provides a
timetable for the IRG’s work, based on the report on themes. Section 46(b) reflects the
statement in paragraph 51 SHA that this report will be commissioned after five years. It
suggests that this five-year period should run not from the date of  the IRG’s establishment
but from the date of  the SHA. Time needs to be allowed for writing and completion of  the
report, for which section 49(5) suggests three years. The aim should be for the IRG to
publish the report as soon as possible thereafter and, for this, section 49(6) allows a
maximum of  one year.
128. Publication of  the report might provide an occasion to consider statements of
acknowledgment and to recommend further activities of  outreach and reconciliation,
reflected in section 49(7) – see below. That should mark the completion of  the IRG’s work
and, on this basis, six months might be sufficient to wind up the IRG after completion of
the report on themes. This is therefore what section 45(1) proposes.
129. There are, however, obvious uncertainties. It is difficult to tell at this stage how precisely
the IRG will fulfil its mandate and how in particular it will deal with the challenges outlined
in paragraph 52 SHA. Section 45(2) therefore allows the Secretary of  State by order to
extend the life of  the IRG.
Section 46 objectives and functions
130. This brings together the objectives and functions of  the IRG as outlined in paragraphs
51–53 SHA. Although paragraph 53 does not attribute a specific role for the IRG in
statements of  acknowledgement, these are to be considered ‘in the context of  the IRG’.
Section 46(d) therefore provides that the IRG should encourage such statements and (in
line with paragraph 53) not just from the two governments but from others. The timing
aspects of  section 46(b) have been referred to above.
Section 47 exercise of functions
131. Particularly in view of  its oversight duties, the IRG should have full independence and
operational autonomy. Although the members of  the IRG are nominated by the political
parties, it is important that the IRG – as the other legacy bodies – operates as an
independent body and complies with the SHA founding principles (for which see
paragraph 21 SHA and section 1(3) of  the Bill). Section 47(2) incorporates the final
sentence of  paragraph 51 SHA on the conduct of  the report on themes. Section 47(3)
allows the IRG to adopt a Code of  Practice, with which it must comply in the conduct of
its proceedings.
Section 48 relationship with other bodies
132. This section gives some specifics to the IRG’s oversight duties in respect of  the ICIR and
OHA, but deliberately does not prescribe these in detail. The drafting committee believes
that the IRG’s oversight of  the ICIR and OHA should be ‘light touch’, allowing these
institutions generally to get on with their work. Section 48(1) therefore mirrors provisions
elsewhere in the Bill for the ICIR and OHA to provide annual reports to the IRG
(paragraphs 4(j) and 10(4) of  the Founding Agreement in Schedule 2 and section 63(2)(m)).
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And section 48(2) enables the IRG to ‘make recommendations’ (but no stronger) to the
ICIR and OHA as to their future activities.
Section 49 report on themes
133. Section 49 describes the procedure and conditions for the report on themes. Section 46(b)
previously states that this should be commissioned five years after the date of  publication
of  the SHA. The provision in section 49(1) that the IRG shall commission the report on
themes picks up this reference.
134. Paragraph 51 SHA states that the report should be commissioned ‘from independent
academic experts’. This is reflected in section 49(1) and section 49(3). The latter provision,
which describes the necessary qualities of  the experts, also draws on wording from other
requirements for the process in the SHA (sensitivity, rigorous intellectual integrity and
devoid of  any political interference).
135. Section 49(2) makes clear that it is the IRG which decides the themes to be included in the
report. This is consistent with paragraph 51 SHA, which also provides, however, that any
of  the legacy mechanisms should be able to refer to the IRG any potential evidence base
for patterns and themes. In practice, the choice of  themes is likely to be the culmination of
an evolving process over the first five years, as the evidence base is developed. It would
therefore be natural for the IRG to consult the other legacy mechanisms before it finally
decides the themes to be included in the report. The drafting committee suggests, also in
section 49(2)(b), that the IRG should consult victims and organisations representing their
interests.
136. Section 49(4) recognises that different experts might be required to work on different
themes and the structure of  the overall ‘report on themes’ might need to be flexible to
accommodate separate studies on separate themes. Sub-sections 49(5) to 49(7) have already
been covered in the commentary above.
Section 50 evidence base
137. This section provides guidance for compilation of  the evidence base. As noted above,
paragraph 51 states only that ‘any potential evidence base for patterns and themes should
be referred to the IRG from any of  the legacy mechanisms . . . for the IRG’s analysis and
assessment’. This recognises that the IRG could not commission the report on themes, nor
could the academic experts after five years compile the report, unless in the first five years
a proper evidence base had been established. Section 50(1) therefore enables the IRG to
compile the evidence base to facilitate the report on themes.
138. Section 50(2) provides for the IRG to engage suitably qualified and vetted analysts and
experts. The vetting requirement follows from section 50(4), which envisages that the
evidence base would include confidential material. Without access to confidential
material, the report on themes is unlikely to be able to add value to existing publications
or achieve more than a normal open-source research project. Section 50(5) enables the
legacy mechanisms to pass such confidential material to the IRG’s analysts and experts
subject to conditions which they might specify. Section 50(6) allows the possibility that
the IRG would also receive information from other public bodies. These provisions stop
short of  requiring other institutions to provide material to the IRG. But it is important
that this should not be used to thwart the IRG’s work. Hence section 50(7) provides that
the two governments should facilitate the provision of  information relevant to the
evidence base.
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PArt 5 orAL HIStory ArCHIve
Section 51 Definitions
139. This section provides a list of  definitions applicable to this Part. As with section 36 in
respect of  Part 4 (the IRG), some definitions might be transferrable to a definitions section
applicable to the whole Bill.
140. Most of  the definitions are straightforward, but it should be noted that ‘collectors’ includes
interviewers collecting new material as well as those tasked with identifying existing
material which may be deposited with the Archive. Likewise, ‘contributors’ includes those
interviewed for existing projects which may now be deposited with the Archive as well as
those contributing new material.
141. Sub-section (d) specifies that ‘oral history material’ includes recordings of  interviews (both
audio and audio-visual) and related documentation and artefacts. The latter may include
transcripts, consent forms, project summaries and descriptions, interview schedules or
indicative topics, metadata, catalogues to collections, biographical cameos for interviewees,
photographs of  interviewees, creative works and other materials that support or inform
recorded interviews (e.g. press-cuttings, films, photographs, unpublished manuscripts).
Section 52 establishment
142. This part seeks to implement para 22 of  the SHA which states: ‘The Executive will, by
2016, establish an Oral History Archive to provide a central place for people from all
backgrounds (and from throughout the UK and Ireland) to share experiences and
narratives related to the Troubles.’
143. In view of  the significant sensitivities and challenges arising, the drafting committee
considers it appropriate that this resource be established by the First Minister and Deputy
First Minister, acting jointly.
144. Sub-section 3 specifies that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, acting jointly, shall
determine the location of  the OHA. It is envisaged that the Archive will, for the most part,
be accessible online. A ‘central place’ could thus be envisaged partly as a cyber-space, but
an appropriate central physical space in which people can listen to recordings and access
supporting documentation should also be provided.
Section 53 Principles of operation
145. This section obligates the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, acting jointly, to give
force to paragraph 24 of  the SHA which states that: ‘The Archive will be independent and
free from political interference.’ This is key to the success of  the OHA. If  the Archive is
to attract the participation and support of  ‘people from all backgrounds and from
throughout the UK and Ireland’, it must be safeguarded against manipulation by vested
interests. As noted in section 57(7), those tasked with running the Archive must be
impartial and perceived to be impartial by potential contributors and stakeholders. It is also
essential that they do not have financial, professional or other interests that are reasonably
likely to conflict with the exercise of  their functions.
146. Sub-section (2) underlines the importance of  consistent adherence to the founding
principles.
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Section 54 Code of practice
147. Sub-section (1) provides for the establishment of  a non-statutory Code of  Practice to
provide guidance on the work of  the OHA.
148. Sub-section (2) notes that the Code of  Practice must include a comprehensive Code of
Ethics designed primarily to safeguard the rights and needs of  contributors. This will
acknowledge and outline the specific measures required to facilitate contributions from
victims and survivors (including, for example, advocate-counsellor assistance where
appropriate). The Code of  Practice will obligate the OHA to take reasonable steps to
protect information that appears to be sensitive or confidential, within the limits of  the law.
This includes anticipation and provisions for the medium to long-term fate of  data. The
Code will also outline the importance of  ensuring that collectors and contributors are
aware of  the legal implications of  acquiring, processing and storing oral history material.
Section 55 Capacity
149. This section stipulates that the Secretary of  State may by regulations confer on the OHA
the legal capacities of  a body corporate. The drafting committee believes that this is the
legal construction most likely to facilitate the independence of  the OHA.
Section 56 Immunity from suit
150. Paragraph 23 of  the SHA states that ‘consideration will be given to protecting contributors,
and the body itself, from defamation claims’. The drafting committee has considered the
full range of  claims that could potentially arise in relation to the exercise of  the functions
of  the OHA and proposes in sub-section (1) to provide immunity from suit for staff  and
agents of  the OHA in respect of  all acts or omissions occurring in good faith in the
execution of  functions in connection with the OHA.
151. In relation to defamation claims, it is suggested that qualified privilege under Schedule 1 of
the Defamation Act 1996 should attach both to statements made by contributors by way
of  contribution to the OHA and records or publications of  such statements by the OHA.
Section 57 Appointment of executive Board and Advisory Board
152. The governance structure for the OHA must enable it to function in a manner that is
‘independent and free from political interference’ (paragraph 24 SHA). It should reflect the
protean nature of  oral history and facilitate the Archive in its ‘attempt to draw together and
work with existing oral history projects’ (paragraph 22 SHA). Developing relationships
with existing projects presents numerous challenges. Existing projects fear that the
proposed OHA could become the oral history archive of  the Troubles, implicitly
threatening or diminishing the contribution that they have made or continue to make. It is
vital that the proposed OHA acknowledges and draws on the considerable expertise,
experience and oral history material that already exists and that it seeks to work with
existing projects in a spirit of  mutually beneficial partnership (see section 63 (3)).
153. The Bill does not propose detailed and prescriptive provisions for governance but the
drafting committee considers that an Executive Board consisting of  three Directors
assisted by an Advisory Board should enable the OHA to function optimally.
154. Section (3) stipulates that the Chair of  the Executive Board and one other executive
Director shall be appointed by the First and Deputy First Minister, acting jointly. In keeping
with the remit outlined in the SHA (paragraph 22) one other Executive Director shall be
appointed by the Secretary of  State, in consultation with the government of  the Republic
of  Ireland.
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155. The role of  the Advisory Board will be critically important. Sub-section (6) states that this
Board shall consist of  seven members. The Chair shall be appointed by the First and
Deputy First Minister, acting jointly, in consultation with the two governments; three
members shall be appointed by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister; one member
shall be appointed by the Secretary of  State; and one member shall be appointed by the
Secretary of  State, in consultation with the government of  the Republic of  Ireland.
156. Sub-section (6)(3) states that one member shall be the Deputy Keeper of  the Public
Records Office of  Northern Ireland (PRONI) ex officio. This acknowledges the expertise of
PRONI in digitising, cataloguing, preserving and providing access to official documentary
records and the potential that exists for the sharing of  resources, facilities and knowledge.
157. Sub-section (7) outlines the skills and attributes necessary for appointment to both the
Executive Board and the Advisory Board. Appointees are likely to include representatives
of  existing oral history projects and networks. Sub-section (8) emphasises the importance
of  ensuring a gender balance across the governance structure.
Section 58 tenure of executive Directors
158. This section sets out the appointment and tenure for the Executive Directors of  the OHA.
Sub-section (2) stipulates that appointment is for five years and may be renewed, subject to
the stated provisions.
Section 59 tenure of members of Advisory Board
159. This section sets out the appointment and tenure for the Advisory Board members. Sub-
section (2) states that appointment is for five years and may be renewed, subject to the
stated provisions.
Section 60 Secretariat
160. The work of  identifying, facilitating, recording, processing, preserving and providing access
to oral history material is time-consuming and demands a range of  practical, technical and
professional skills. Section 60 thus provides for the establishment of  a Secretariat to
provide research, archival, interviewing and other professional and administrative support
to the OHA. Sub-section (2) stipulates that the Directors shall appoint the staff  of  the
OHA. The relevant skills and expertise are referred to in sub-section (3). These include the
same qualities and attributes required of  Executive and Advisory Board members in
section 57(7). Sub-section (3) underlines the potential for memory to provoke psychosocial
and traumatic harm and also the need for gender sensitivity in exercising judgements about
the functions and development of  the Archive.
161. Sub-section (4) notes that staff  may be (but need not be) appointed on secondment from
a public authority, including PRONI. 
Section 61 remuneration and allowances
162. This section stipulates the First and Deputy First Ministers, acting jointly, shall specify the
appropriate remuneration and allowances for the Executive Directors. The Executive
Directors will, in turn, determine the remuneration and allowances of  staff.
Section 62 funding
163. This section guarantees adequate funding (including payments and expenses to staff  and
Advisory Board members and the provision of  appropriate premises and facilities) for the
OHA out of  the Consolidated Fund. It also provides for publication of  a statement that
details transparent accounting procedures and the operational independence of  the OHA.
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164. These provisions stop short of  specifying the precise funding arrangements beyond the
establishment costs drawn from the Consolidated Fund. It is, however, vital that the OHA
is funded beyond the five-year period envisaged for other mechanisms. Providing an
adequately resourced central repository for existing and new oral history material related to
the Troubles is key to the success of  the OHA. Here it can build on the work of  Incore’s
Accounts of  the Conflict project and help to bridge a critical gap between the impulse to collect
and the obligation to preserve our shared cultural heritage. Collecting, safeguarding and
providing access to oral history material in the medium to long term is central to the legal
and ethical framework that will be embodied in the Code of  Practice and to the principle
of  ‘promoting reconciliation’. It will enable victims and survivors to engage with the
Archive at a time and place that best suits their needs, enable contributors to renegotiate
memories, and facilitate intergenerational understanding and learning.
165. It is intended that contributors will be invited to assign copyright in their interviews to the
OHA and that the OHA will be equipped with the resources necessary to enable it to
attend to long-term storage and preservation of  oral history material. It may alternatively
enter into negotiations with existing repositories with regard to the sharing of  facilities and
resources for the purposes of  long-term preservation. Consent and copyright waivers will
be styled accordingly.
Section 63 the work of the oHA
166. This substantive section outlines the specific work of  the OHA. Sub-section (1) sets out
the two core aims: to collect new oral history material from people from all backgrounds
throughout the UK and Ireland and to seek to draw together and work with existing oral
history projects.
167. Sub-section (2) outlines the necessary steps to achieve these aims. They are designed to
meet and mitigate a number of  interrelated challenges and risks. Firstly, buy-in from the
necessary range of  contributors and stakeholders cannot be taken for granted. Secondly,
there is a real danger that the OHA could (from the outset) be manipulated by vested
interests. It is therefore imperative that the Archive does not rely on a process of  voluntary
self-selection and instead engages in comprehensive outreach and engagement.
168. Comprehensive outreach and engagement is also necessary to identify and acknowledge the
good work that has been done and that continues to be done by existing oral history
projects and to avoid duplication of  effort.
169. It is by no means easy or straightforward to identify themes that will ‘promote
reconciliation’ and ‘acknowledge and address the suffering of  victims and survivors’. It
is equally challenging to identify and collect experiences and narratives in a manner that
is ‘balanced’ and ‘proportionate’. Promoting reconciliation may demand that we go
beyond narrow political definitions and terms of  reference and think creatively and
flexibly about ways and means of  capturing perspectives that either have not been heard
or that need to be heard in the interests of  real and lasting peace and reconciliation. The
work of  the Advisory Board will be key in helping to draw out these challenges and
dilemmas. Sub-section (2)(b) notes the importance also of  consulting with international
stakeholders who have encountered similar challenges in transitional and post-conflict
settings, and with the IRG.
170. Sub-section (2)(e) provides for a central training programme designed to enable people
from across the UK and Ireland to collect interviews in their communities and
organisations for deposit with the OHA and to ensure that collectors comply with the
Code of  Practice. This is intended as a cost-effective means of  enabling the OHA to
operate with as much flexibility as possible, and with minimal organisational structure and
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constraint. A centralised training programme could, we suggest, borrow from the success
of  commercial franchise operations. It would ensure that a wide range of  organisations
from throughout the UK and Ireland are facilitated in the creation of  appropriate oral
history material and that their efforts and zeal are given the necessary direction and quality
control. This model is underscored by the principle of  subsidiarity – the belief  that the
central OHA should not perform tasks more appropriately undertaken by those closest to
the ground.
171. Sub-sections (2)(f–j) provide for the conduct, processing and preservation of  recordings
and relevant supporting data. They emphasise in particular that all reasonable steps must
be taken to safeguard contributions which are to be kept confidential.
172. Sub-sections (2)(k) and (2)(l) point to the fact that material accruing to the OHA is
primarily intended for immediate public access. To facilitate the sharing of  experiences and
narratives and confrontation with ‘other voices’ the OHA must prepare and make available
catalogues of  oral history material and facilitate free public access – both online and at a
designated physical location.
173. Sub-section (2)(m) requires the OHA to make progress reports to the IRG at least annually.
These should include reference to categories of  interviewees that have engaged with or
declined to engage with the Archive. They should also outline the process of  identifying
themes and topics for interviews. Preliminary analysis of  the interview material may help
to identify themes for further consideration by the IRG.
174. Sub-section (3) acknowledges the considerable challenges (practical, ethical and legal) of
attempting to ‘draw together and work with existing oral history projects’ (paragraph 22
SHA). Sub-section (3)(c) thus suggests that a designated member of  the Secretariat should
lead on this aspect of  the work. As noted in paragraph 152 above, the relationship between
the OHA and existing projects and networks should be mutually beneficial. The OHA
could, for example, address a critical gap in terms of  providing adequate resources to
digitise and safeguard oral history material into the future. Training opportunities could
also benefit existing oral history projects. The precise arrangements governing the
relationship between the OHA and existing oral history projects (e.g. deposit of  existing
collections or deposit of  new material collected under the auspices of  the OHA in line with
its Code of  Practice) must be determined on a case-by-case basis after due consultation and
agreement.
175. Sub-section (3) emphasises the importance of  avoiding duplication of  effort and/or
diminishing the good work that has gone before. This extends both to existing projects and
to networks such as the Healing Through Remembering Storytelling Network. The
proposed strategy of  outreach to existing projects and stakeholders is designed to ensure
that public monies are deployed wisely and prudently in pursuit of  the founding principles
and that relations between the OHA and existing projects and networks are mutually
beneficial and supportive.
176. Sub-section (3)(g) states that, where existing projects choose to deposit material (whether
in duplicate or in toto) with the OHA, the terms of  the original deposit will to the fullest
extent possible be respected. 
Section 64 Arrangements with ProNI
177. This section acknowledges that PRONI has significant expertise in relation to the
digitisation, cataloguing and preservation of  official records and as such may wish to share
facilities, equipment and expertise.
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Section 65 engagement with contributors
178. This section describes the nature of  the relationship between the OHA and contributors.
It stipulates that engagement with the OHA is voluntary and that contributors can
withdraw from the process at any time. It also obligates the OHA to take all reasonable
steps to ensure that contributors appreciate in advance the potential legal consequences of
engaging with the OHA. Should contributors provide sensitive or confidential data, the
OHA shall take all necessary steps to avoid identifying them prematurely. It will also
provide contributors, wherever possible, with a copy of  the final version of  the oral history
material which they have contributed. This may exclude material that the OHA and/or the
contributor hav deemed unfit for immediate publication.
Section 66 obtaining and holding information
179. This section acknowledges the risks associated with the OHA taking possession of
information relating to specific offences or alleged offences that have not been fully dealt
with by the courts of  all relevant jurisdictions and obligates the OHA to avoid such a
situation arising.
180. Sub-section (2) acknowledges the risk associated with the leakage of  information that could
breach a person’s rights under the ECHR and thus requires that the OHA processes and
stores data in a suitably secure manner.
Section 67 Publication of information
181. This section arises from paragraph 23 of  the SHA which states that: ‘The Archive will
bring forward proposals on the circumstances and timing of  contributions being made
public.’ Sub-section (1) notes that the primary intention of  the OHA is to make oral
history material publicly available. Subsequent sub-sections detail the necessary exceptions
to this rule.
182. Sub-section (2) points to the necessity of  subjecting all material accepted by the OHA to a
sensitivity review to establish whether it should be kept confidential for a specified period.
Sub-section (3) notes that a contribution may be so embargoed if  a contributor so requests
or, in the absence of  such a request, the OHA considers that publication would present a
substantive risk to an individual.
183. Sub-section (4) notes that decisions as to the circumstances and timing of  contributions
being made public will be arrived at in consultation with contributors. Sub-section (5)
notes, however, that there may be circumstances in which the OHA must overrule the
stated preference of  a contributor. As noted in sub-section (6), such decisions will be
arrived at after due consideration of  the contributor’s wishes and in consultation with
properly trained staff  and international best practice.
184. Sub-section (7) suggests that a contribution will only be kept confidential for a period
longer than 30 years if  the OHA is satisfied that publication of  the contribution or relevant
part thereof  would continue to present a substantive risk to an individual.
185. Sub-section (8) acknowledges that many contributors may be reticent about contributing
‘experiences and narratives related to the Troubles’ and that such accounts are likely to
include reference to issues of  considerable local, familial or public sensitivity. In order to
protect and offer reassurance to contributors the drafting committee thinks it advisable to
disapply the Data Protection Acts and the Freedom of  Information Act 2000 to all
contributions until such times as a contribution has been finalised by the OHA and
thereafter to any contribution which the OHA decides to keep confidential in accordance
with this section.
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186. Sub-section (9) specifies that in the unlikely event of  a court order demanding that the
OHA disclose or provide access to a contribution, the OHA must immediately notify the
relevant contributor (or next of  kin) and provide them with an opportunity to make
representations to the relevant authority. This might include demonstration of  the steps
taken to ensure that the specified contribution does not include information about specific
offences or alleged offences that have not been fully dealt with by the courts of  all relevant
jurisdictions.
187. Sub-section (10) provides further clarification on the meaning in this section of  a
‘contribution’ and ‘a substantive risk to an individual’.
Section 68 Arrangements with the republic of Ireland
188. This section acknowledges the obligation in paragraph 22 SHA to facilitate contributions
from ‘throughout the UK and Ireland’ and suggests that the OHA should make such
arrangements with bodies (oral history networks, archives, libraries and other such
organisations) as it sees fit.
189. Sub-section 2 notes that the Northern Ireland Executive and the Secretary of  State shall,
as appropriate, facilitate this process, if  necessary by the conclusion of  arrangements
between the two governments (including, if  necessary, supporting legislation)
PArt 6 GeNerAL
190. This Part deals with interpretation of  various terms and the procedure for the adoption of
regulations and is self-explanatory.
SCHeDuLe 2 text of tHe AGreeMeNt BetweeN tHe uNIteD KINGDoM
AND IreLAND oN tHe eStABLISHMeNt of tHe INDePeNDeNt
CoMMISSIoN oN INforMAtIoN retrIevAL
Paragraphs 1 to 3 establishment, objective and guiding principles
191. These paragraphs agree the establishment of  the ICIR, specify its objective as set out in
the SHA and subject its operations to the guiding principles set out in the SHA.
Paragraph 50 of  the SHA includes additional principles, specific to the ICIR, of
independence and rigour.
Paragraph 4 Specific functions
192. Paragraph (4) lists the specific functions of  the ICIR which are, in the opinion of  the
drafting committee, the minimum necessary if  it is in fact to carry out the intentions of  the
SHA. As such, it is important that these functions be listed in the Agreement between the
UK and Ireland which will provide the foundation stone of  the ICIR. Although some
aspects are elaborated upon in subsequent paragraphs, further detailed guidance on the
complex and sensitive work that will be necessary if  the ICIR is to be effective should be
given in the Code of  Practice.
193. Sub-paragraph (a) deals with the preparation of  a Code of  Practice. Some of  the points
that might be included in a Code of  Practice are the need for a strategic communication
plan, the need to work across the UK and Ireland and with, for example, conflict-affected
communities, community groups, religious organisations, ex-prisoners’ associations,
current and former security force personnel and other groups, political parties, women’s
organisations and through social media, websites and public advertisements. Similar details
will be required for other functions, although the nature of  work with victims, reports to
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victims and the collection, holding and use of  information are prescribed in somewhat
more detail in subsequent paragraphs.
194. Sub-paragraphs (h) and (j) provide for giving effect to SHA paragraph 51 by the ICIR
making reports to the IRG which might recommend themes for investigation. In addition,
following the recommendations made in the Haass-O’Sullivan proposals, the model treaty
also notes that these reports could identify classes of  person who have and have not
cooperated with the ICIR. The drafting committee recommends that the Code of  Practice
provide for these reports to be published. This would both be in line with the principle of
transparency and would also contribute to public confidence in the operation of  the
Commission. These arrangements for reporting to the IRG eschew any suggestion that the
IRG would have a managerial or supervisory role over the ICIR which would compromise
its independence.
Paragraph 5 Appointment
195. Sub-paragraphs (1) to (6) largely follow the appointment procedure noted in paragraph 44
SHA. Sub-paragraph (3) provides that the two members of  the Commission nominated by
the First and Deputy First Ministers are formally appointed by the two governments. This
is to reflect the fact that the ICIR is to be established as an international body on the basis
of  an inter-state treaty; it is therefore important that the contracting state parties have
formal control of  the appointment process.
196. Sub-paragraph (8) lays out criteria which amount to a personal specification for those to be
appointed as Commissioners. The drafting committee thinks it is important that these
criteria be laid out in the Founding Agreement in order to ensure, as far as possible, that all
people and groups in these islands are able to have confidence in the impartiality and
qualifications of  those appointed.
197. Sub-paragraph (9) requires that, within the limits of  anti-discrimination legislation, the two
governments work together to ensure that at least two of  the Commissioners are women.
Paragraph 6 tenure
198. In order to ensure the independence and autonomy of  the Commissioners, this paragraph
lays down the limited circumstances in which a Commissioner may be dismissed and how
substitute appointments should occur.
Paragraph 7 remuneration and allowances
199. This paragraph states that the Commissioners should work full time and be appropriately
remunerated.
Paragraph 8 Secretariat
200. In a further measure to ensure independence, this paragraph provides for the
Commissioners to appoint their own staff. It also requires that staff  appointed have the
same qualities of  expertise, independence and impartiality as required of  Commissioners
in paragraph 5(8).
Paragraph 9 funding
201. This paragraph provides for adequate funding (see paragraph 94 above) and transparent
accounting procedures.
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Paragraph 10 Independence
202. This paragraph provides that the ICIR be independent and have complete operational
autonomy. Sub-paragraph (3) specifies that the operations of  the ICIR are not to be
constrained by the actions of  other investigative bodies including the HIU. It also
specifically allows the ICIR to require the provision of  information from the HIU or
other public bodies in order to assess the reliability of  information otherwise provided.
It will be necessary for there to be protocols or a memorandum of  understanding
between the HIU and the ICIR in order that there be no contamination of  HIU
investigations by reason of  enquiries made by the ICIR and to regulate other aspects of
cooperation.
Paragraph 11 Commencing an information retrieval process
203. This paragraph provides that the ICIR may commence an information retrieval process
either in response to requests from victims and survivors or in response to requests from
persons with information. Sub-paragraph (2) makes clear that this process can be initiated
regardless of  other investigations in to the same matter.
Paragraph 12 engagement with victims and survivors
204. This paragraph expands on the function of  engaging with victims. Sub-paragraph (1)
stresses the voluntary character of  the engagement and that a victim can withdraw at any
time. Sub-paragraph (2) ensures that victims are warned that engagement might have legal
consequences such as, in some circumstances, affecting the likelihood of  successful future
prosecutions, in spite of  the protections built into the process. Sub-paragraph (3) provides
that support must be given to victims during and after the process. Dealing with victims is
going to be one of  the most difficult and sensitive areas of  work for the ICIR. Some of
the matters that might be included in a Code of  Practice are the need to work with victims’
organisations, how to work with disparate or divided families, how support should be given
to victims, and the nature of  the actual process to be followed by those victims who wish
to engage with the Commission.
Paragraph 13 reports to victims and survivors
205. This paragraph deals with the content of  reports and the protocols conditioning their
contents and publication. Sub-paragraph (1) requires that the ICIR provide a report on
request, which will contain at least the tests of  reliability of  information carried out and
any new evidence received. However, sub-paragraph (3) provides that a report does not
have to be given until the Commission thinks its processes are completed, but it may issue
interim reports. Sub-paragraph (2) prohibits the publication of  reports by the ICIR (though
families would be free to do what they wish with reports).
206. Sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) provide that the ICIR may not identify individuals who have
provided information to it, but may identify organisations who may be responsible for any
acts or omissions recorded. Sub-paragraph (6) means that no report can contain
information that might put an individual’s life at risk. Sub-paragraph (7) provides that those
providing information will be given relevant privileges and immunities (see paragraph 97
above).
Paragraph 14 expenses
207. This paragraph provides that the expenses of  victims and other people cooperating with
the Commission may be paid and that other support might be offered. The practical
implications of  this will need to be detailed in a Code of  Practice.
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Paragraph 15 obtaining information
208. This paragraph is the foundation for the power suggested in section 35(2) of  the Model
Bill (see comments in paragraph 98 above) to compel public authorities to provide
information. Sub-paragraph (3) permits the ICIR to seek information outside these islands
and diplomatic support from the two governments is to be provided. Sub-paragraph (4)
makes it clear that the ICIR is not to be regarded as a form of  de-commissioning body or
as providing an amnesty mechanism for the handing in of  weapons or other articles which
may be relevant to criminal investigations.
209. It is suggested that the Code of  Practice might address matters such as how the
commission should seek to engage with possible information providers, how meetings will
be conducted, and how information recovery might be a process involving several meetings
and processes. 
Paragraph 16 Holding and disclosing information
210. This paragraph provides that the ICIR shall hold information in a secure and ECHR-
compliant manner and that it will not disclose either information or the identity of
information providers to law enforcement or other public authorities. The code of  practice
should require the Commission to set up data management systems to enable it to do data
analysis and cross-check between information provided. Section 32(6) of  the Model Bill
stipulates that the archives of  the ICIR should be held securely and confidentially for 50
years in a manner to be determined by the ICIR.
Paragraph 17 use of information
211. This paragraph is the foundation for the power provided for in Section 35(3) and (4)
which makes any information given to the ICIR inadmissible in legal proceedings. Sub-
paragraph (2) notes that information already in the possession of  a public authority may
be so used, even if  it is provided to ICIR, and also that a prosecution of  a person may
proceed in reliance on evidence obtained elsewhere even if  that information is also
provided to the ICIR.
Paragraph 18 offences
212. This paragraph makes provision for the offences detailed. Please note the comments made
on behalf  of  the drafting committee in paragraph 100 above.
Paragraph 19 entry into force
213. This paragraph provides that the Agreement will enter into force on the first day of  the
second month after completion of  legal formalities by the state Parties.
Paragraph 20 Duration of Agreement
214. This paragraph provides the Agreement will continue in force until terminated by mutual
agreement by the two governments, but it will continue to have effect after such
termination in relation to meeting liabilities or disposing of  remaining assets of  the
Commission.
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